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Abstract
Unlike convex case, a local equilibrium point of a nonconvex Nash-Cournot oligopolistic
equilibrium problem may not be a global one. Finding such a local equilibrium point or even
a stationary point of this problem is not an easy task. This paper deals with a numerical
method for Nash-Cournot equilibrium models involving nonconvex cost functions. We develop
a local method to compute a stationary point of this class of problems. The convergence of
the algorithm is proved and its complexity is estimated under certain assumptions. Numerical
examples are implemented to illustrate the convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm.
Keywords. Nonconvex Cournot-Nash models, splitting proximal point method, local equilib-
ria, gradient mapping.
1 Introduction
Nash-Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium models have been widely applied in economics, electricity
markets, transportation, networks as well as in environments. Such a model can be formulated as
a game model, where each player has a profit function which can be expressed as the difference of
its price and cost functions. In classical models, the price function is affine while the cost function
is assumed to be convex. In this case, a local equilibrium point is also a global one. Mathematical
programming and variational inequality approaches can be used to treat this problem (see, e.g.,
[3, 4, 8, 9, 14]).
In practical models, the cost per a unit usually decreases as the production level increases. This
situation requires a nonconvex function to represent the production cost of the model. In [15], a
global optimization algorithm has been developed to find a global equilibrium point to the Nash-
Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium market model involving piecewise concave cost functions. However,
global algorithms only work well for the problems of moderate size, while it becomes intractable when
the size of the problem increases, except for special structures are exploited.
In this paper, we continue the work in [15] by proposing a local solution method for finding
a stationary point of Nash-Cournot equilibrium models with nonconvex (not necessarily concave)
cost functions. We consider a Nash-Cournot model involving an affine price function and nonconvex
smooth production cost functions. With this structure, the cost function of the model can be
decomposed as the sum of a convex quadratic function and a nonconvex smooth function. Then,
we develop a local method for finding a stationary point of such a model. The method is called a
splitting proximal point algorithm. The main idea of this algorithm is to preserve the convexity of
the problem while convexifies the nonconvex part by linearizing it around each iteration point.
Proximal point methods have been well developed in optimization as well as in nonlinear analysis.
Myriad of research papers concerned to these methods were published (see, e.g., [11, 12, 22, 23]
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and the references quoted therein). However, all these papers only deal with a class of monotone
problems. Recently, Pennanen in [21] extended the proximal point method to nonmonotone cases
for solving variational inequality problems. Lewis [11] further generalized this algorithm in a unified
framework using the prox-regularity concept [23]. A main point of the proximal point methods is
to choose the proximal parameter sequence. This affects to the performance of the algorithm as
well as its global convergence behavior. Gu¨ler in [6] investigated the rate of global convergence of
the classical proximal point methods for convex programs. The worst case complexity bound of this
method is O(1/k), where k the number of iterations. The author further accelerated the classical
proximal point method to get a better complexity bound for the convex programming problems,
precisely, O(1/k2) [7] by using the idea of Nesterov for gradient methods [18]. A splitting proximal
point are also developed in many research papers. Such a method was applied to optimization
problems by Mine and Fukushima in [13] and, recently, by Nesterov in [17].
This paper contributes a new local method for finding a stationary point of a Nash-Cournot
equilibrium models involving the nonconvex cost functions. The algorithm called splitting proximal
point method is presented and its convergence is investigated. The global worst case complexity
bound is also provided, which is O(1/
√
k), where k is the iteration counter. To our knowledge, this
is the first estimation proposed to Nash-Cournot equilibrium model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a formulation of a Nash-Cournot
oligopolistic equilibrium model involving nonconvex cost function. The problem is reformulated as
a mixed variational inequality. In Section 3, we define three concepts including local and global
equilibria, and stationary points of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium model. Section 4 deals with a
gradient mapping and its properties. The splitting algorithm is described in Section 5, where its
convergence is proved and the worst-case complexity is estimated. Two numerical examples are
implemented in the last section.
2 Mixed variational inequality formulation
We consider a Nash-Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium market models with n-firms producing a com-
mon homogeneous commodity in a non-cooperative fashion. The price p of production depends on
the total quantity σ :=
∑n
i=1 xi of the commodity. Let hi(xi) denote the cost of the firm i when its
production level is xi. Suppose that the profit of firm i is given as
fi(x1, · · · , xn) := xip
( n∑
i=1
xi
)− hi(xi), i = 1, . . . , n, (2.1)
where hi is the cost function of the firm i which is assumed to only depend on its production level.
Let Ci ⊂ R (i = 1, . . . , n) denote the strategy set of the firm i, which is assumed to be closed and
convex. Each firm seeks on its strategy set to maximize the profit by choosing the corresponding
production level under the presumption that the production of the other firms are parametric inputs.
In this context, a Nash equilibrium is a production pattern in which no firm can increase its profit by
changing its controlled variables. Thus under this equilibrium concept, each firm determines its best
response given other firms’ actions. Mathematically, a point x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n)
T ∈ C := C1×· · ·×Cn
is said to be a Nash equilibrium point if
fi(x
∗
1, · · · , x∗i−1, yi, x∗i+1, · · · , x∗n) ≤ fi(x∗1, · · · , x∗n), ∀yi ∈ Ci (i = 1, . . . , n). (2.2)
When hi is affine, this market problem can be formulated as a special Nash equilibrium problem
in the n-person non-cooperative game model, which in turns is a strongly monotone variational
inequality (see, e.g., [9]).
Let us define
Ψ(x, y) := −
n∑
i=1
fi(x1, · · · , xi−1, yi, xi+1, · · · , xn), (2.3)
and
φ(x, y) := Ψ(x, y)−Ψ(x, x). (2.4)
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Then, as proven in [9], the problem of finding an equilibrium point of this model can be reformulated
as the following equilibrium problem:
Find x∗ ∈ C such that: φ(x∗, y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C. (EP)
This generalized setting was proposed by Blum and Oettli in [2] (see also in [15]).
In classical Cournot models [4, 9], the price and the cost functions for each firm are assumed to
be affine and given as follows:
p(σ) = α0 − βσ, α0 ≥ 0, β > 0, with σ =
n∑
i=1
xi, (2.5)
hi(xi) = µixi + ξi, µi > 0, ξi ≥ 0 (i = 1, . . . , n). (2.6)
In this case, using (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), it is easy to check that
φ(x, y) = (B˜x+ µ− α)T (y − x) + 1
2
yTBy − 1
2
xTBx,
where
B =


2β 0 0 · · · 0
0 2β 0 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 0 0 0 2β

 ; B˜ =


0 β β · · · β
β 0 β · · · β
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
β β β · · · 0

 ,
α = (α0, . . . , α0)
T , and µ = (µ1, . . . , µn)
T .
Then the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium point can be formulated as a mixed variational
inequality of the form:
Find x∗ ∈ C such that:
(B˜x∗+µ−α)T (y−x∗)+ 1
2
yTBy− 1
2
(x∗)TBx∗ ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ C. (2.7)
Let Q := B + B˜. Since β > 0 and matrices B˜ and B are symmetric, it is clear that Q is symmetric
and positive definite. This mixed variational inequality can be reformulated equivalently to the
following strongly convex quadratic programming problem:
min
x∈U
{1
2
xTQx+ (µ− α)Tx}. (QP)
Hence, problem (QP) has a unique optimal solution, which is also the unique equilibrium point of
the classical oligopolistic equilibrium market model.
The oligopolistic market equilibrium models, where the profit functions fi (i = 1, . . . , n) of each
firm is assumed to be differentiable and convex with respect to its production level xi while the
other production levels are fixed, are studied in [4] (see also [9]). This convex model is reformulated
equivalently to a monotone variational inequality.
In practical models, the production cost function hi assumed to be affine is no longer satisfied.
Since the cost per a unit of the action does decrease when the quantity of the commodity exceeds
a certain amount. Taking into account this fact, in the sequel, we consider market equilibrium
models where the cost function h may not be convex, whereas the price function is affine as in (2.5).
Typically, the cost function h is given as:
h(x) :=
n∑
i=1
hi(xi), (2.8)
where hi (i = 1, . . . , n) is differentiable and nonconvex.
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Let us denote by
F (x) := B˜x− α˜
ϕ(x) := g(x)− h(x),
where α˜ := α− µ, g(x) := 12xTBx and h(x) defined as (2.8).
Obviously, matrix B˜ is symmetric, using the same notation B˜, B and α as in (2.7), we can
formulate the nonconvex Nash-Cournot equilibrium model as a mixed variational inequality:
Find x∗ ∈ C such that:
F (x∗)T (y − x∗) + ϕ(y)− ϕ(x∗) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C. (ncMVIP)
Note that mixed variational inequality problems of the form (ncMVIP), where ϕ is convex, i.e. h is
concave, were extensively studied in the literature (see, e.g., [1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 16, 19, 24]).
Remark 2.1. If the function ϕ is convex and differentiable then problem (ncMVIP) can be reformu-
lated equivalently to a classical variational inequality problem. More generally, it can be converted
to a generalized variational inequality problem when ϕ is convex and subdifferentiable (see, e.g.
[9]). However, the mixed variational inequality (ncMVIP) can not equivalently transform into a
variational inequality if ϕ is nonconvex.
Note, if we define φ(x, y) := F (x)T (y− x) +ϕ(y)−ϕ(x) then problem (ncMVIP) coincides with
a nonconvex equilibrium problem of the form (EP).
3 Local equilibria and stationary points
Unlike the convex case, if the cost function ϕ of the problem (ncMVIP) is nonconvex, it may not
have a global equilibria even if C is compact, and F and ϕ are continuous. Indeed, let us consider
C := [−1, 1] ⊂ R, F (x) := x and ϕ(x) = − 12x2, which is concave, then F (x)T (y−x)+ϕ(y)−ϕ(x) =− 12 (y − x)2. Therefore, problem (ncMVIP) corresponding to this function has no solution.
For a given x ∈ C, let B(x, r) be an open ball centered at x of radius r > 0 in Rn. Borrowing
the concepts from classical optimization, we firstly propose a local equilibria and critical points (or
stationary points) of the mixed variational inequality (ncMVIP).
Definition 3.1. A point x∗ ∈ C is called a local solution (or local equilibria) to (ncMVIP) if there
exists a ball B(x∗, r) such that
F (x∗)T (y − x∗) + ϕ(y)− ϕ(x∗) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C ∩ B(x∗, r). (3.1)
If C ⊆ B(x∗, r) then x∗ is called a global solution (or global equilibria) to (ncMVIP).
Let
ψ(x; y) := (B˜x− α˜)T (y − x) + 1
2
yTBy − h(y). (3.2)
We consider a function m : C × R++ → R and a mapping S : C × R++ ⇒ 2C defined as follows:
m(x; r) := min
{
ψ(x; y) | y ∈ C ∩ B(x, r)} , (3.3)
S(x; r) := argmin
{
ψ(x; y) | y ∈ C ∩ B(x, r)} , (3.4)
where B(x, r) stands for the closure of the open ball B(x, r). As usual, we refer to m as a local gap
function for problem (ncMVIP). Obviously, if h is continuous and C is compact then the function
m as well as the mapping S are well-defined. If h is concave then S is reduced to a single valued
mapping due to the symmetric and positive definiteness of B.
The following proposition gives a necessary and sufficient conditions for a point to be a local or
global solution to (ncMVIP).
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Proposition 3.1. The function m defined by (3.3) satisfies m(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ C. Moreover, the
following statements are equivalent:
a) x∗ is a local solution to (ncMVIP);
b) There exists r¯ > 0 and x∗ ∈ C such that m(x∗; r¯) = 0;
c) There exists r¯ > 0 and x∗ ∈ C such that x∗ ∈ S(x∗; r¯).
Proof. Note that ψ(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ C, and for any x ∈ C and r¯ > 0, x ∈ C ∩ B(x, r¯).
Therefore, from the definition (3.3) of m, it is clear that, with a given r¯ > 0, m(x; r¯) =
min {ψ(x, y) | y ∈ C ∩ B(x, r¯)} ≤ ψ(x, x) = 0 for every x ∈ C. The equivalence bewteen b) and
c) is trivial. We only prove that a) is equivalent to b).
Suppose that there exists r¯ > 0 and x∗ ∈ C such that m(x∗, r¯) = 0. It follows from the definition
of m that ψ(x∗, y) ≥ ψ(x∗, x∗) = 0 for all x ∈ B(x∗, r¯) ∩ C. In particular, ψ(x∗, y) ≥ 0 for all
y ∈ C ∩B(x∗, r¯). Thus x∗ is a local equilibria of (ncMVIP). Conversely, if x∗ is a local equilibria of
(ncMVIP) then there exists a neighbourhood B(x∗, r) such that r > 0 and
F (x∗)T (y − x∗) + ϕ(y)− ϕ(x∗) ≥ F (x∗)T (x∗ − x∗) + ϕ(x∗)− ϕ(x∗) = 0, ∀y ∈ C ∩ B(x∗, r).
Since r > 0 and B(x∗, r) ⊂ Rn, there exists 0 < r¯ ≤ r such that B(x∗, r¯) ⊆ B(x∗, r). This relation
shows that the last inequality holds for all y ∈ C ∩ B(x∗, r¯). Therefore, m(x∗, r¯) = 0.
Clearly, if the conclusions of Proposition 3.1 hold for a given r¯ > 0 and C ⊆ B(x∗, r¯) then x∗ is
a global solution to (ncMVIP).
Next, let us define
FC(x) := {d := t(y − x) | y ∈ C, t ≥ 0} , (3.5)
a cone of all feasible directions of C starting from x ∈ C. The dual cone of FC(x) is the normal
cone of C at x which is defined as
NC(x) :=
{{
w ∈ Rn | wT (y − x) ≥ 0, y ∈ C} , if x ∈ C,
∅, otherwise. (3.6)
By Proposition 3.1, a point x ∈ C is a local solution to (ncMVIP) if and only if it solves the following
optimization problem:
x ∈ argmin
{
(B˜x− α)T (y − x) + 1
2
yTBy − h(y) | y ∈ C ∩ B(x, r¯)
}
, (3.7)
for some r¯ > 0. Since h is not necessarily concave, finding such a point x satisfying (3.7), in general,
is not an easy task. In this paper, we concentrate in finding a stationary point rather than local
equilibrium. We develop a method to find such a point for (ncMVIP). Borrowing the concept of
stationary points in optimization, we define a stationary point (or a critical point) for the mixed
variational inequality (ncMVIP) as follows.
Definition 3.2. A point x ∈ C is called a stationary point (or critical point) to the problem
(ncMVIP) if
0 ∈ Qx− α˜−∇h(x) +NC(x), (3.8)
where NC is defined by (3.6) and Q := B˜ +B.
Since NC is a cone, for any c > 0, the inclusion (3.8) is equivalent to
0 ∈ c[(B˜ +B)x − α˜−∇h(x)] +NC(x). (3.9)
Let
Dφ(x; d) := [(B˜ +B)x − α˜−∇h(x)]T d, (3.10)
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for any x ∈ C and d ∈ FC(x). Then the condition (3.8) is equivalent to
Dφ(x∗; d) ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ FC(x∗). (3.11)
Let us denote by S∗ the set of stationary points of (ncMVIP). The following lemma shows that
every local equilibria of problem (ncMVIP) is its stationary point. The proof is simple and short,
we present here for reading convenience.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that h is continuously differentiable on its domain. Then, every local equilibria
is a stationary point of problem (ncMVIP).
Proof. Suppose that x∗ is a local equilibria of (ncMVIP). Then there exists a neighborhood B(x∗, r)
of x∗ such that F (x∗)T (y−x∗)+ϕ(y)−ϕ(x∗) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ B(x∗, r)∩C. According to Proposition
3.1, this requirement is equivalent to x∗ is a local solution of
min
{
(B˜x∗ − α˜)T (y − x∗) + 1
2
yTBy − h(y) | y ∈ B(x∗, r¯) ∩ C
}
, (3.12)
for 0 < r¯ ≤ r. Since h is continuous differentiable, the function inside the brackets is also continuous
differentiable. Applying the first order necessary optimality condition for the smooth optimization
problem (3.12) (see, e.g., [18]), we obtain:
0 ∈ (B˜ +B)x∗ − α˜−∇h(x∗) +NC∩B(x∗,r¯)(x∗).
However, NC∩B(x∗,r¯)(x
∗) = NC(x
∗) ∩N
B(x∗,r¯)(x
∗) = NC(x
∗).
(3.8).
Let ∂δC(x) denote the subdifferential of the indicator function δC of C at x. One has ∂δC(x) =
NC(x). Since matrix B is symmetric and positive definite, if we define g1(x) :=
1
2x
TBx+δC(x) then
∂g1(x) = Bx+ ∂δC(x) and this mapping is maximal monotone. Consequently, T
−1
c := (I + c∂g1)
−1
is well-defined and single valued, where I is the identity mapping (see [22, 23]).
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a stationary point of
(ncMVIP).
Proposition 3.2. A necessary and sufficient condition for a point x ∈ C to be a stationary point
to problem (ncMVIP) is:
x = (I + c∂g1)
−1
(
x− c(B˜x− α˜) + c∇h(x)
)
, (3.13)
where c > 0 and I stands for the identity mapping.
Proof. Since g1 is proper closed convex, the inverse
(
I + ∂g1
)−1
is single valued and defined every-
where [22]. Thus x satisfies (3.13) if and only if x− c(B˜x− α˜) + c∇h(x) ∈ (I + c∂g1)(x). Moreover,
since NC(x) is a cone and ∂g1(x) = Bx + ∂δC(x) = Bx +NC(x), the latter inclusion is equivalent
to 0 ∈ B˜x− α˜+Bx−∇h(x) +NC(x), which shows that x is a stationary point of (ncMVIP).
Now, if we define yc(x) := x− c(B˜x− α) + c∇h(x) and
Sc(x) :=
(
I + c∂g1
)−1(
x− c(B˜x− α) + c∇h(x)), (3.14)
then, it follows from Proposition 3.2 that x = Sc(x). Therefore, every stationary point x of (ncMVIP)
is a fixed-point of Sc(·). To compute Sc(x), it requires to solve the following strongly convex quadratic
problem over a convex set:
min
{
1
2
yTBy +
1
2c
‖y − yc(x)‖2 | x ∈ C
}
, (3.15)
This problem has a unique solution for any c > 0.
Finally, we introduce the following concept, which will be used in the sequel. For a given tolerance
ε ≥ 0, a point x∗ ∈ C is said to be an ε-stationary point to (ncMVIP) if
Dφ(x∗; d) ≥ −ε, ∀d ∈ FC(x∗), ‖d‖ = 1. (3.16)
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4 Gradient mapping and its properties
By substituting yc(x) into (3.15), after a simple rearrangement, we can write problem (3.15) as
min
{
1
2
yTBy + [B˜x− α˜−∇h(x)]T (y − x) + 1
2c
‖y − x‖2 | y ∈ C
}
. (4.1)
Now, we consider the following mappings:
mc(x; y) :=
1
2
yTBy+[B˜x−α˜−∇h(x)]T(y − x)−h(x)+ 1
2c
‖y − x‖2, (4.2)
and sc(x) := argmin {mc(x; y) | y ∈ C} . (4.3)
Then, since problem (4.3) is strongly convex, sc(x) is well-defined and single-valued. Let us define
Gc(x) :=
1
c
[x− sc(x)]. (4.4)
The mapping Gc(·) is referred as a gradient-type mapping of (3.3) [17]. Appyling the optimality
condition for (4.3) we have[
Bsc(x) + B˜x− α˜−∇h(x) −Gc(x)
]T
(y − sc(x)) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ C. (4.5)
From now on, we further suppose that the cost function h is Lipschitz continuous differentiable
on C with a Lipschitz constant Lh > 0, i.e.
‖∇h(x)−∇h(y)‖ ≤ Lh‖x− y‖, ∀x, y ∈ C. (4.6)
By using the mean-valued theorem, it is easy to show that the condition (4.6) implies
∣∣h(y)− h(x)−∇h(x)T (y − x)∣∣ ≤ 1
2
Lh‖y − x‖2, ∀x, y ∈ C. (4.7)
The following lemma shows some properties of Dφ(·; ·).
Lemma 4.1. For any x ∈ C, we have
Dφ(sc(x);x − sc(x)) ≥ 1− c(Lh + ‖B˜‖)
c2
‖Gc(x)‖2, (4.8)
Dφ(sc(x); y−sc(x))≥−[1+c(Lh+‖B˜‖)]‖Gc(x)‖‖y−sc(x)‖, ∀y∈C. (4.9)
As a consequence, for any d ∈ FC(sc(x)) with ‖d‖ = 1, we have
Dφ(sc(x); d) ≥ −[1 + c(Lh + ‖B˜‖)]‖Gc(x)‖. (4.10)
Proof. From the definition of Dφ in (3.10), we have
Dφ(sc(x);x− sc(x))=
[
B˜sc(x)−α˜+Bsc(x)−∇h(sc(x))
]T
(x−sc(x))
=
[
B˜x− α˜−∇h(x) +Bsc(x)
]T
(x− sc(x))
(4.11)
−
[
B˜sc(x)− α˜−∇h(sc(x)) − B˜x− α˜+∇h(x)
]T
(sc(x) − x)
≥
[
B˜x− α˜−∇h(x) +Bsc(x)
]T
(x− sc(x))− (Lh + ‖B˜‖)‖x− sc(x)‖2.
Substituting (4.5) into (4.11) we obtain
Dφ(sc(x);x− sc(x)) ≥ (1
c
− [Lh + ‖B˜‖)]‖x− sc(x)‖2
=
1− c(Lh + ‖B˜‖)
c2
‖Gc(x)‖2,
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which proves (4.8).
Using again (4.5) and (4.6) we have
Dφ(sc(x); y − sc(x)) =
[
B˜sc(x)− α˜+Bsc(x) −∇h(sc(x)
]T
(y − sc(x))
=
[
B˜sc(x) − α˜−∇h(sc(x))
]T
(y − sc(x)) + (Bsc(x))T (y − x)
≥
[
B˜sc(x) − α˜−∇h(sc(x))
]T
(y − sc(x))
+
[
B˜x−∇h(x) + 1
c
(sc(x)− x)
]T
(sc(x) − y)
=
[
B˜sc(x) −∇h(sc(x)) − (B˜x− α˜) +∇h(x)
]T
(y − sc(x)) +Gc(x)T (sc(x)− y)
≥ −(Lh + ‖B˜‖)‖x− sc(x)‖‖y − sc(x)‖ − ‖Gc(x)‖‖y − sc(x)‖
≥ −
[
1 + c(Lh + ‖B˜‖)
]
‖Gc(x)‖‖y − sc(x)‖,
which proves (4.9).
By the convexity of C, there exists t ≥ 0 such that sc(x)+td ∈ C, where ‖d‖ = 1. If we substitute
y := sc(x) + td ∈ C into (4.9) then we get
Dφ(x; td) ≥ −t(1 + cLfh+ c‖B˜‖)‖Gc(x)‖. (4.12)
If t = 0 then (4.9) automatically holds. If t > 0 then by the linearity of D with respect to the second
argument, we divide both sides of (4.12) by t > 0 to get (4.9).
Remark 4.1. For a fixed x ∈ C, if we define ec(x) := ‖Gc(x)‖ and rc(x) := ‖x − sc(x)‖ then ec(x)
decreases in c and rc(x) increases in c.
Indeed, let q(y, c) := (B˜x − α˜)T (y − x) + 12yTBy − h(x) − ∇h(x)T (y − x) + 12c‖y − x‖2. Then
q is convex jointly in two arguments y and c. Thus ω(c) := miny∈C q(y, c) is convex. It is easy to
see that ω′(c) = − 12‖Gc(x)‖2 increases in c. Hence, ec(x) decreases in c. If we replace c by 1/c in
q(y, c), this function becomes concave in c, then by the same argument as ω(·), we conclude that
rc(x) increases in c.
Since B and B˜ are symmetric, we consider a potential function defined as follows:
γ(x) :=
1
2
xTBx+
1
2
xT B˜x− α˜Tx− h(x), (4.13)
Then, γ is nonconvex but Lipschitz continuous differentiable. We have the following statement.
Lemma 4.2. For x, y ∈ C, we have
mc(x; sc(x)) + x
T B˜x− αTx ≤ γ(x)− c
2
‖Gc(x)‖2. (4.14)
Moreover, if c(Lh + ‖B˜‖) ≤ 1 then
mc(x; sc(x)) +
1
2
xT B˜x− α˜Tx ≥ γ(sc(x)). (4.15)
Proof. It is obvious from the definition of mc(x;x) that φ(x) = mc(x;x) +
1
2x
T B˜x − α˜Tx. Since
mc(x; ·) is strongly convex quadratic with modulus 12c , using (4.13) we have
γ(x)−mc(x; sc(x)) − 1
2
xT B˜x+ α˜Tx = mc(x;x) −mc(x; sc(x))
≥ 1
2c
‖x− sc(x)‖2 = c
2
‖Gc(x)‖2,
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which proves (4.14).
To prove (4.15), from (4.7) and the definition of γ we have
γ(sc(x)) −mc(x; sc(x)) − 1
2
xT B˜x+ α˜Tx =
1
2
[
sc(x)B˜sc(x) − xT B˜x− 2(B˜x)T (sc(x)− x)
]
− h(sc(x)) + h(x) +∇h(x)T (sc(x) − x)− 1
2c
‖sc(x)− x‖2
≤ 1
2
(sc(x)− x)T B˜(sc(x) − x) + (cLh − 1)
2c
‖sc(x) − x‖2
≤ −1− c(Lh + ‖B˜‖)
2c
‖sc(x)− x‖2.
By assumption c(Lh + ‖B˜‖) ≤ 1, we obtain (4.15).
If we combine the inequalities (4.15) and (4.14) in Lemma 4.2 then:
γ(sc(x)) ≤ γ(x)− c
2
‖Gc(x)‖2. (4.16)
This inequality plays an important role in proving the convergence of the splitting proximal point
algorithm in the section.
For a given starting point x0 ∈ C, let us define the level set of γ with respect to C as
Lγ(γ(x0)) :=
{
x ∈ C | γ(x) ≤ γ(x0)} . (4.17)
From (4.16), it is obvious that if x0 ∈ Lγ(γ(x0)) then sc(x0) ∈ Lγ(γ(x0)) provided that c(Lh+‖B˜‖) ≤
1.
5 A splitting proximal point algorithm and its convergence
Proposition 3.2 suggests that a proximal point method can be applied to find a stationary point of
(ncMVIP). For the implementation purpose, the proximal mapping defined by (3.14) is extracted
to the expression (3.15). The splitting proximal point algorithm constructs an iterative sequence as
follows:
Algorithm 1. (The splitting proximal algorithm)
Initialization: Choose a positive number c0 > 0. Find an initial point x
0 ∈ C and set k := 0.
Iteration k: For a given xk, execute the three steps below.
Step 1 : Evaluate ∇h(xk) and set yk := xk − ck(B˜xk − α) + ck∇h(xk).
Step 2 : Compute xk+1 by solving the following convex quadratic program over a convex set:
min
{
1
2
xTBx+
1
2ck
‖y − yk‖2 | y ∈ C
}
. (5.1)
Step 3 : If ‖xk+1 − xk‖ ≤ ε for a given tolerance ε > 0 then terminate, xk is an ε-stationary
point of (ncMVIP). Otherwise, update ck and increase k by 1 and go back to Step 1.
In Algorithm 1 we left unspecified the way to update ck. If the Lipschitz constant Lh is provided
then we can choose ck =
1
Lγ
for all k, where Lγ := Lh + ‖B˜‖. Otherwise, a line-search procedure
can be used to update ck. The latter procedure is briefly described as follows. First, we choose two
constants c and c¯ such that c > 0 and 1
Lγ
≤ c¯ < +∞. Then we perform the following steps.
• Given a constant τc ∈ (0, 1). Choose an initial value of c in [c, c¯].
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• Compute sc(xk). While the decreasing condition
γ(sc(x
k)) ≤ mc(xk; sc(xk)) + 1
2
(xk)T B˜xk − α˜Txk. (5.2)
does not satisfy, increase c by c := τcc and recompute sc(x
k).
• Set ck+1 := c.
Now, we define ∆xk := xk+1 − xk and
δk := min
0≤i≤k
‖∆i‖2
2ci
. (5.3)
The convergence of the splitting proximal point algorithm is stated as follows.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the function h is Lipschitz continuous differentiable on C with a Lip-
schitz constant Lh ≥ 0. Suppose further that for a given x0 ∈ C the level set Lγ(γ(x0)) is bounded
(particularly, C is bounded). Then the sequence {xk}k≥0 generated by Algorithm 1 starting from x0
satisfies:
δk ≤
(γ(x0)− γ)
k + 1
, ∀k ≥ 0, (5.4)
where γ := inf
x∈Lγ(γ(x0))
γ(x). Moreover, for any d ∈ FC(xik ) with ‖d‖ = 1, we have
Dφ(xik ; d) ≥ −(1 + cLh + c‖B˜‖)
√
2(γ(x0)− γ)
k + 1
, (5.5)
where ik is the index such that cik‖Gcik (xik )‖2 = ∆k.
As a consequence, if the sequence {xk} generated by (5.1) is bounded, then every limit point of
this sequence is a stationary point of (ncMVIP). The set of limit points is connected and if it is
finite then the whole sequence {xk} converges to a stationary point of (ncMVIP).
Proof. Since Lγ(γ(x0)) is bounded by assumption, we have γ := infx∈Lγ(γ(x0)) γ(x) is well-defined
due to the continuity of γ and the closedness and nonemptiness of Lγ(γ(x0)) (since x0 ∈ Lγ(γ(x0)).
From Step 3 of Algorithm 1, if either the constant parameter ck =
1
Lγ
or the line search procedure
is used then it implies
γ(xk+1) +
1
2ck
‖xk+1 − xk‖2 ≤ mck(xk+1) + (B˜xk − α˜)Txk ≤ γ(xk), ∀k ≥ 0. (5.6)
Note that the whole sequence {xk} is contained in Lγ(γ(x0)). Rearrange and sum up these inequal-
ities for k = 0 to k = K we get
K∑
k=0
1
2ck
‖xk+1 − xk‖2 ≤ γ(x0)− γ(xK+1) ≤ γ(x0)− γ. (5.7)
Then the inequality (5.4) directly follows from the definition of δ in (5.3). Combining (5.4) and
(4.10) in Lemma 4.1 we obtain (5.5).
To prove the remainder, taking into account Remark 4.1 and then passing to the limit as k tends
to ∞ the resulting inequality of (5.7), we get
∞∑
k=0
1
2c¯
‖xk+1 − xk‖2 < +∞.
Since c¯ < +∞, this inequality implies that limk→∞ ‖xk+1 − xk‖ = 0. Therefore, the set of limit
points is connected. Combine this relation and the assumptions of boundedness of {xk} it is easy
to show that every limit point of {xk} is a stationary point of (ncMVIP). When the set of the limit
points is finite, the last statement of the theorem is proved similarly using the same technique as in
[20][Chapt. 28].
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Remark 5.1. For a given tolerance ε > 0, according to Theorem 5.1, the number of iterations k
to get an ε-stationary point is O(ε2). Consequently, the worst-case complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(1/
√
k).
6 Numerical test
In this section, we consider to numerical examples involving concave cost functions. The aim of
these examples is to estimate the number of iterations of Algorithm 1 in a certain case compared
to the worst-case complexity given in Theorem 5.1. In addition, we also test the time profile of the
algorithm when the size of problem increases.
The algorithm is implemented in Matlab 7.8.0 (R2009a) running on a Pentium IV PC desktop
with 2.6GHz and 512Mb RAM. We assume that the feasible set C of (ncMVIP) is a box in Rn.
Therefore, the convex problem (3.15) reduces to quadratic programming. We solve this problem by
using the quadprog solver (a built-in Matlab solver).
Example 1. Suppose that the cost function hi(xi) of the firm i is given as hi(xi) = c
0
i+ci ln(1+rixi),
where c0i ≥ 0 is the ceiling cost, ci > 0 and ri > 0 are given. The function h becomes
h(x) = c0 +
n∑
i=1
ci ln(1 + rixi) = c
0 + ln
n∏
i=1
(1 + rixi)
ci , (6.1)
where c0 =
∑n
i=1 c
0
i . It is obvious that hi is well-defined if xi ≥ 0 and h′i(xi) = ciri1+rixi , which implies
that h is differentiable on C = Rn+ and
∇h(x) = ( c1r1
1 + r1x1
, . . . ,
cnrn
1 + rnxn
)T . (6.2)
Since h′′i (xi) = −cir2i /(1+rixi)2, we have |h′′i (xi)| ≤ cir2i and h is concave. Moreover,∇h is Lipschitz
continuous with the Lipschitz constant Lh := max{cir2i | i = 1, . . . , n}.
In this example, we choose β = 0.1 > 0, α = 10, c0i = 2, ci = 1.5 for all i = 1, . . . , n, and
ri = 1+ ωi, where ωi is randomly generated in (0, 1) (i = 1, . . . , n). The strategy set of the firm i is
defined by Ci := [0, 10] for all i = 1, . . . , n.
We test Algorithm 1 for problem (ncMVIP) with the size increasing from 10 to 1000. The
tolerance ε is 10−3. The number of iterations as well as the CPU time with respect to the size of
problem is visualized in Fig1. and Fig2., respectively.
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Fig1. Number of iterations depending on n [Ex. 1]
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Fig2. CPU time depending on n [Ex. 1]
From (5.5) of Theorem 5.1, it implies that the number of iterations k to reach an ε-stationary
point depends on the structure of the function h and the value γ(x0)− γ, Lh and ‖B˜‖. Since h is a
logarithm function, the value of h slowly increases in n, while the Lipschitz constant Lh ≤ 1.5×22 = 6
for all n and the norm ‖B˜‖ = (n − 1)β. Consequently, the worst-case complexity bound increases
almost linearly in n. As can be seen from the first figure, the number of iterations increases with
a small slope when the size of problem grows up. The curvature of this graph stays below a linear
line generated by the worst-case complexity bound. The CPU time also increases almost linearly in
the size of problem.
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Example 2. In this example, we choose the cost function hi as hi(xi) = c
0
i − cie−rixi , where
c0i ≥ ci > 0 and ri > 0 given. It is easy to see that h′′i (xi) = −ciα2i e−rixi < 0, then hi is concave.
Since hi is differentiable on R, it means that h is differentiable on R
n and ∇h is expressed by
∇h(x) = (c1r1e−r1x1 , · · · , cnrne−rnxn)T . (6.3)
We have |h′′i (xi)| ≤ cir2i for all i = 1, . . . , n, thus ∇h is Lipschitz continuous on Rn with the Lipschitz
constant Lh := max{cir2i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
To compare with the previous example, we choose the value of the parameters α and β as in
Example 1. The parameters c0i and ci are given by c
0
i = 4 and ci = 2 for all i = 1, . . . , n. The
parameter ri := 0.1 + 0.1randi, where randi is generated randomly in (0, 1).
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Fig3. Iterations depending on n [Ex. 2]
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Fig4. CPU time depending on n [Ex. 2]
We also test Algorithm 1 for the problem size from 10 to 1000. The number of iterations and
the CPU time are plotted in Fig3. and Fig4., respectively. Since the function γ rapidly increases
in n compared to the previous case, the number of iteration also increases. Consequently, the CPU
time respectively increases.
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